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Substantial Government Interference 
with Prosecution Witnesses: The Ninth 
Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Juan 
Ruth A. Moyer†
On January 7, 2013, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in United 
States v. Juan.
 
1 As a matter of first impression, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the constitutional proscription on substantial 
governmental interference with defense witnesses also applies 
to prosecution witnesses.2
By extending the “substantial interference” rule to prose-
cution witnesses, Juan fundamentally, albeit implicitly, recog-
nized a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause aspect of the 
“substantial interference” rule. Moreover, future application of 
Juan may require that courts consider the propriety of a 
factfinder receiving evidence about any governmental actions 
that potentially caused a prosecution witness to “alter” his or 
her testimony.  
 Thus, the Juan decision instructs 
that a prosecutor’s or trial court’s “substantial interference” 
with a prosecution witness’s testimony may violate a defend-
ant’s right to a fair trial. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF PRIOR LAW   
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Consti-
tution ensure that no person shall be deprived “of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”3
 
†  A 2008 cum laude graduate of Temple Law School, the author current-
ly practices criminal defense in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Copyright © 2013 
by Ruth A. Moyer. 
 Furthermore, the 
“Compulsory Process Clause” of the Sixth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
 1. 704 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 2. Id. at 1142. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
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accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor.”4 Consequently, the right to 
due process in a criminal prosecution includes the right to pre-
sent witness testimony “to the jury so it may decide where the 
truth lies.”5
Citing due process protections and the right to compulsory 
process, the U.S. Supreme Court has proscribed judicial inter-
ference with a defendant’s ability to present a witness in his or 
her defense. In its 1972 decision in Webb v. Texas, the Court 
held that where a trial court threatened a prospective defense 
witness about the risks of a perjury prosecution if he testified, 
the judge’s remarks caused the witness to refuse to testify and 
violated the defendant’s due process rights.
  
6 Importantly, the 
Webb trial court did not merely warn the witness that he had 
the right to decline to testify and that his testimony must be 
truthful; instead, the trial court indicated that it expected the 
defense witness “to lie, and went on to assure him that if he 
lied he would be prosecuted and probably convicted for per-
jury.”7 The Supreme Court concluded that the judge’s remarks 
“effectively drove” the defense witness “off the stand, and thus 
deprived the [defendant] of due process of law.”8
A defendant’s due process protections and right to compul-
sory process also prohibit interference by the prosecution with 
defense witnesses. Many courts have subsequently held that 
the “conduct of prosecutors, like the conduct of judges, is un-




 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 
858, 867 (1982) (noting that the Sixth Amendment provides defendants with a 
“compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”).  
 In short, it is well estab-
lished that “substantial government interference” by a trial 
judge or a prosecutor with a defense witness’s decision to testify 
in a criminal prosecution “amounts to a violation of due pro-
cess” and deprives a criminal defendant of his Sixth Amend-
 5. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).  
 6. Id. at 353–54.  
 7. Id. at 353.  
 8. Id. 
 9. United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that a “number of post-Webb cases reveal that the trial judge is not the only 
person whose admonitions against perjury can deprive a criminal defendant of 
his right to compulsory process”); see also, e.g., United States v. Hooks, 848 
F.2d 785, 799–800 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Viera, 819 F.2d 498, 502–
03 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 
1982).  
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ment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor.10
Not all perjury warnings will constitute “substantial inter-
ference.” As the Ninth Circuit explained in United States v. 
Vavages, the substantial interference test is “extremely fact 
specific”; in assessing the “coercive impact of perjury warn-
ings,” courts should consider factors such as “the manner in 
which the prosecutor or judge raises the issue, the language of 
the warnings, and the prosecutor’s or judge’s basis in the record 
for believing the witness might lie.”
 
11 A warning may be less co-
ercive where the court or the witness’s counsel relays the mes-
sage.12 “[P]erjury warnings are not improper per se”; instead, a 
“defendant’s constitutional rights are implicated only where the 
prosecutor or trial judge employs coercive or intimidating lan-
guage or tactics that substantially interfere with a defense wit-
ness’[s] decision whether to testify.”13
Critically, the Ninth Circuit Vavages decision noted, in 
passing, the issue of “[w]hether or not [the] Webb [prohibition] 




II.  THE 2013 NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN UNITED 
STATES V. JUAN   
 More than a decade later, the Ninth Circuit 
has finally resolved this question.  
During a heated argument, Jarvis Juan kicked and 
punched his wife, “C.J.,” and ran over her with the couple’s 
SUV.15
 
 10. Vavages, 151 F.3d at 1188. A defendant bears the burden of demon-
strating substantial interference by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
 While she was in a hospital recovering from her inju-
 11. Id. at 1190.  
 12. See id. at 1191 (“[A] defendant may not be prejudiced by a prosecutor's 
improper warnings where counsel for a witness strips the warnings of their 
coercive force.”).  
 13. Id. at 1189; see also United States v. Jaeger, 538 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (approving of a court’s warnings to a prospective defense witness 
that do not “impose a decision” for a witness and that do not convey “an as-
sumption that perjury would occur” or a “threat of prosecution for perjury”).  
 14. Vavages, 151 F.3d at 1191 n.1 (emphasis added). In United States v. 
Williams, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor had “inappropriately in-
timidated [a] government witness . . . with a perjury warning.” 375 Fed. App’x. 
682, 687 (9th Cir. 2010). However, it was unnecessary for the Ninth Circuit to 
reach this issue because, despite the warnings, the witness testified “at length 
and[] regardless of her alleged fears,” recanting her previous testimony that 
had implicated the defendant. Id.  
 15. United States v. Juan, 704 F.3d 1137, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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ries, C.J. gave a tape-recorded interview with the police in 
which she stated that Juan had beaten her and had run over 
her.16 The government indicted Juan in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Arizona on charges of assault with a danger-
ous weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and § 113(a)(3) and 
assault resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1153 and § 113(a)(6).17
At trial, the prosecution called C.J. as a witness.
  
18 On di-
rect examination by the prosecution, C.J. testified that she had 
accidentally fallen behind the SUV and that Juan had never hit 
her.19 The trial court denied the government’s motion to intro-
duce as evidence C.J.’s earlier statements to the police.20 Out of 
the presence of C.J. and the jury, the government asserted to 
the trial court that C.J. “needs a lawyer appointed because I be-
lieve she’s committed perjury and [sic] after looking at jail calls 
between her and her husband I actually believe she’s commit-
ted perjury.”21 Agreeing with the government’s contention, the 
trial court appointed counsel for C.J.22 After C.J. consulted with 
her court-appointed attorney, the government recalled C.J. to 
the stand.23 At that point, C.J. testified that Juan had hit her 
and had run over her with the SUV.24 Juan was convicted of all 
counts and sentenced to thirty-seven months of imprisonment.25
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, Juan contended that his constitutional right to a fair trial 
was violated where the government “threatened” his wife with 
perjury charges and thus coerced her into giving incriminating 
testimony against him.
  
26 The Ninth Circuit observed, “What is 
not unquestionably governed by Webb is whether the govern-
ment’s substantial interference with the testimony of its own 
witness can ever violate a defendant’s due-process rights.”27
 
 16. Id. 
 The 
court stated, “[T]o our knowledge, no court applying Webb has 
ever extended its principles to prosecution witnesses. Similarly 
 17. Id. at 1139–40.  
 18. Id. at 1140. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1141. 
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no court applying Webb has ever extended it to situations, like 
this one, where the allegedly threatened witness continued to 
testify after the alleged threat. Instead, the prototypical Webb 
challenge involves conduct so threatening as to ‘effectively 
drive [the] witness off the stand.’”28
First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “Webb and its prog-
eny should apply to all witnesses.”
  
29 Noting that prosecutors 
and other officials should “‘maintain a posture of strict neutral-
ity when advising witness of their duties and rights,’” the Juan 
court reasoned that “[v]iolating this duty by bullying a prosecu-
tion witness away from testimony that could undermine the 
government’s case is no less distortive of the judicial fact-
finding process than improperly meddling with the testimony of 
a defense witness.”30 The Ninth Circuit asserted, “Regardless of 
whose witness is interfered with, the constitutional harm to the 
defendant is the same—the inability to mount a fair and com-
plete defense. We see no reason to doubt that the government’s 
substantial interference with the testimony of its own witness-
es can violate the Due Process Clause.”31
Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the substantial 
and wrongful interference with a prosecution or defense wit-
ness that does not ‘drive the witness off the stand,’ but instead 
leads the witness to materially change his or her prior trial tes-
timony can, in certain circumstances, violate due process.”
 
32 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “such violations have the po-
tential to work even greater harm than those that simply result 
in a blanket refusal to testify.”33 Where the government “co-
erce[s]” a witness “into recanting testimony that was favorable 
to the defendant, the harm to the defense involves not merely 
the prevention of prospective testimony that might have bol-
stered its case, but the retraction of testimony that did bolster 
its case.”34
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit determined that Juan was 
not entitled to relief because he did not offer any evidence 
demonstrating that the “allegedly threatening statements . . . 
 
 
 28. Id. (citing United States v. Jaeger, 538 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 
2008)) (alteration in original). 
 29. Id. at 1141.  
 30. Id. at 1142.  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. (citing United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 
(1982)).  
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were ever communicated to C.J.”35 Absent evidence that C.J. 
had heard the prosecutor’s remarks or that her lawyer relayed 
those remarks to her, Juan failed to “establish the necessary 
causal link between the prosecutor’s ‘threats’ and C.J.’s 
changed testimony.”36
III.  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNITED STATES V. JUAN   
 The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed his 
conviction.  
The Ninth Circuit decision in Juan marked a significant 
expansion of the prohibition on substantial government inter-
ference. It extended Webb to all witnesses, including govern-
ment witnesses. Furthermore, Juan instructs that Webb’s ap-
plicability is not limited to instances in which the witness is 
“driven off the stand.” Instead, Webb also applies where the 
witness testifies, but, in response to governmental “warnings,” 
fails to provide exculpatory evidence in his or her trial testimo-
ny. To that extent, Juan implicitly, albeit fundamentally, add-
ed a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause basis for the 
“substantial interference” doctrine.  
The watershed Juan decision provides critical guidance for 
other courts in cases where a criminal defendant alleges sub-
stantial government interference with a prosecution witness’s 
testimony. Problematically, prosecution witnesses often decline 
to provide truthful inculpatory testimony against defendants 
because they fear retribution as a result of their testimony. 
Juan meaningfully aids prosecutors and trial courts in deter-
mining how to properly warn these “difficult” witnesses about 
the consequences of providing potentially false “exculpatory” 
testimony.  
Concomitantly, however, the practical implications of the 
rule announced in Juan will necessitate further consideration 
by courts. Courts will likely need to address whether (and to 
what extent) the presentation of evidence to the factfinder 
about the government’s “warnings” to a prosecution witness 
can ameliorate the potential prejudice caused in Juan-type sit-
uations. Similarly, warnings “not on the record” will necessitate 
further analysis by courts. 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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A. “NON-GOVERNMENTAL” INTIMIDATION OF PROSECUTION 
WITNESSES HEIGHTENS IMPORTANCE OF THE JUAN DECISION 
The widespread problem of unlawful, “non-governmental” 
intimidation against prosecution witnesses suggests that the 
Juan rule may become increasingly important to courts, de-
fendants, and prosecutors. Law enforcement and prosecutors 
“describe chronic difficulties” with witnesses who “refuse to 
step forward” or who decide “at the last minute” to recant their 
prior accusatory testimony against the defendant.37
B. ADDITION OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PREMISE TO 
“SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE” FRAMEWORK 
 In some 
cases, the defendant or third parties threaten the witness in 
order to prevent the witness from testifying as a prosecution 
witness. In other instances, the defendant or third parties “en-
courage” the witness to “create” testimony that exculpates the 
defendant. Given these realities, it is easy to conceive of situa-
tions in which a prosecutor or trial judge encounters a prosecu-
tion witness who insists on providing “exculpatory testimony” 
that the prosecutor or trial judge, acting in good-faith, believes 
to be false. The Juan rule will provide much-needed guidance 
to prosecutors and judges concerning the manner in which they 
may warn recalcitrant prosecution witnesses about potential 
perjury charges.  
Dealing exclusively with “substantial interference” with de-
fense witnesses, Webb and its progeny were premised on gen-
eral Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process protections 
as well as the Sixth Amendment “compulsory process” right. 
Critically, however, the Ninth Circuit’s extension of Webb to 
prosecution witnesses also implicitly relies upon the Sixth 
Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses.  
Under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, a crim-
inal defendant “shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him.”38
 
 37. Brendan O’Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, Witness Intimidation, 39 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 399, 400 (2010); see also, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Scared Silent—In 
Prosecution of Gang, A Chilling Adversary: The Code of the Streets, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/19/nyregion/19gangs 
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 As the U.S. Supreme Court has 
noted, the Confrontation Clause “provides two types of protec-
tions for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those 
who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  
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examination.”39 A criminal defendant’s “right to cross-examine 
includes the opportunity to show that a witness is biased, or 
that the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable.”40 Courts 
have therefore instructed that a “defendant’s right to elicit ex-
culpatory defense evidence through cross-examination falls 
within the ambit” of fundamental due process.41
The Juan decision correctly recognizes that situations may 
arise in which a prosecution witness available to testify at trial 
may provide exculpatory evidence—on either direct examina-
tion or cross-examination. To illustrate, even if a prosecution 
witness provides inculpatory evidence on direct examination, 
he or she may also possess exculpatory information that a crim-
inal defendant wishes to elicit during cross-examination. In 
short, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Juan fundamentally pro-
tects a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to elicit exculpatory 
evidence from an “adverse” government witness. 
  
The Supreme Court has instructed, “Whether rooted direct-
ly in the Due Process Clause . . . or in the Compulsory Process 
or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Consti-
tution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful oppor-
tunity to present a complete defense.’”42
C. THE ROLE OF THE FACT-FINDER AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
CROSS-EXAMINING A PROSECUTION WITNESS CONCERNING 
POSSIBLE “SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE” BY THE PROSECUTOR 
 The confrontation val-
ues that the Juan decision incorporated into the “substantial 
interference” doctrine comport with this right to “present a 
complete defense.”  
Not only does the Juan rule implicitly safeguard a defend-
ant’s confrontation rights, but confrontation rights may help 
minimize any harm caused by a prosecutor’s “substantial inter-
ference” with a prosecution witness’ exculpatory testimony. 
Juan cogently noted that the effect of a prosecutor’s coercion of 
a witness “into recanting testimony that was favorable to the 
defendant” has “the potential to work even greater harm than 
[warnings] that simply result in a blanket refusal to testify.”43
 
 39. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987).  
 
As a result, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is 
 40. Id. at 51–52.  
 41. Brown v. Ruane, 630 F.3d 62, 72 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)). 
 42. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).  
 43. United States v. Juan, 704 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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uniquely critical within Juan-type situations in order to chal-
lenge the testimony of a prosecution witness who is present in 
court.  
Cross-examination “affords a defendant ‘a meaningful op-
portunity to cross-examine witnesses against him in order to 
show bias or improper motive for their testimony.’”44 In short, a 
jury should be given “sufficient information” to make a “dis-
criminating appraisal” of a witness’s motives and biases.45
Notably, many courts have held that a prosecutor may pre-
sent evidence that third parties have threatened a prosecution 
witness in order to explain the witness’s inconsistent state-
ments. As the Seventh Circuit has stated, “the evidence of 
threats is necessary to account for the specific behavior of a 
witness that, if unexplained, could damage a party’s case.”
 The-
se principles equally justify the conclusion that defendants 
should be permitted to cross-examine prosecution witnesses 
about any “perjury threats” that the prosecution or the trial 
court may have conveyed to them. 
46 
For example, in order to explain a prosecution witness’s incon-
sistent statements, a prosecutor may properly elicit evidence 
regarding threats that the witness had received from gang 
members in retaliation for his testimony against the defend-
ant.47
Critically, however, the ability of a defendant to cross-
examine a prosecution witness concerning any “perjury 
threats” should not foreclose the defendant from raising a sepa-
rate substantial interference claim—at trial as well as during 
post-trial review proceedings. Cross-examination of a witness 
merely provides a means to lessen the unfair prejudice result-
 Extending the rule to encompass Juan-like scenarios, 
even where a prosecutor makes a “perjury warning” with com-
pletely legitimate intentions, this warning may be relevant to a 
factfinder’s assessment of a witness’s credibility and the rea-
sons for his or her inconsistent testimony.   
 
 44. Corby v. Artus, 699 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Brinson v. 
Walker, 547 F.3d 387, 392 (2d Cir. 2008)). To illustrate, a defendant has “the 
right to cross-examine an accomplice regarding the nature of and benefits, in-
cluding unprosecuted crimes, afforded under the plea agreement.” United 
States v. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 45. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d at 987 (citations omitted).  
 46. United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 47. See, e.g., United States v. Doddles, 539 F.3d 1291, 1295–96 (10th Cir. 
2008) (noting that evidence that witness “experienced negative consequences” 
for his testimony and that he was reluctant to testify at trial was relevant to 
rebut defense counsel’s attempts to impeach his testimony).  
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ing from substantial interference with a testifying prosecution 
witness in Juan-type situations. In some cases, however, even 
effective cross-examination may fail to sufficiently remedy the 
due process violation created by the government’s substantial 
interference with its own witness. Therefore, courts will likely 
need to address the extent to which evidence presented to the 
factfinder concerning the government’s warnings can effectively 
mitigate any prejudice caused by the government’s substantial 
interference.  
D. DISCOVERABILITY OF WARNINGS “NOT ON THE RECORD” 
Application of the Juan rule may be problematic where the 
prosecutor’s perjury warnings to the prosecution witness do not 
appear on the record. To illustrate, a prosecutor may advise a 
prosecution witness during a pre-trial “prep session” that if the 
witness falsely testifies in an exculpatory fashion at trial, he or 
she will face a perjury prosecution. Depending on “the manner 
in which the prosecutor . . . raises the issue, the language of the 
warnings, and the prosecutor’s . . . basis in the record for be-
lieving the witness might lie,” the prosecutor’s warning may be 
proper.48
In these “non-record” situations, it is likely advisable for 
the government to notify defense counsel about any warnings 
given to prosecution witnesses.
  
49 Furthermore, the presence of 
a third party when the prosecutor conveys the warnings may be 
helpful in the event that the prosecutor’s warnings become an 
issue at trial or on post-trial review.50
As in Juan, another difficult situation may arise in which 
(1) the prosecutor or trial court conveys the “threat of perjury” 
to the witness’s counsel—but not to the witness directly—and 
(2) there is no available evidence establishing whether the wit-
 
 
 48. United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 49. Constitutional due process protections mandate “that the government 
has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable 
to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 
480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)); see 
also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
 50. “Unless a prosecutor is prepared to forgo impeachment of a witness by 
the prosecutor’s own testimony as to what the witness stated in an interview 
or to seek leave to withdraw from the case in order to present the impeaching 
testimony, a prosecutor should avoid interviewing a prospective witness except 
in the presence of a third person.” AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STAND-
ARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.1(g) 
(3d ed. 1993), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal 
_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pfunc_toc.html.  
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ness’s counsel conveyed the warning to the witness. To illus-
trate, Juan was not entitled to relief because he did not demon-
strate that the “allegedly threatening statements . . . were ever 
communicated to C.J.”51 Without evidence that C.J.’s attorney 
had relayed to her the prosecutor’s remarks, Juan failed to “es-
tablish the necessary causal link between the prosecutor’s 
‘threats’ and C.J.’s changed testimony.”52 In this situation, the 
defendant should have the right to cross-examine the prosecu-
tion witness about whether his or her attorney conveyed any 
“perjury warnings” from the prosecution or trial court. Citing 
attorney-client privilege, the witness may decline to answer the 
question.53 Nonetheless, as the Ninth Circuit has persuasively 
noted, a perjury warning is generally less coercive where it is 
the witness’s counsel that relays it to the witness.54
  CONCLUSION   
 Thus, the 
best strategy may be for prosecutors and judges to avoid com-
municating perjury warnings directly to the witness; instead 
the witness’s counsel should convey “indirect warnings” to his 
or her client-witness.  
The Juan rule effectively balances the government’s legit-
imate interest in preventing a government witness from provid-
ing false “exculpatory” testimony with a defendant’s fundamen-
tal right to elicit exculpatory evidence from a government 
witness. Thus, the rule implicates not only a defendant’s rights 
to due process and compulsory process, but also, by implication, 
a defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses. The Ninth 
Circuit’s sound reasoning in Juan provides much-needed guid-
ance for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and courts that must 
confront the applicability of Webb in the context of prosecution 
witnesses. Nonetheless, despite the Ninth Circuit’s substantive 
directive, future courts will likely be tasked with determining 
how best to apply the Juan rule. Ultimately, given the strong 
potential of Juan-type situations to occur in future prosecu-
tions, courts will have ample opportunity to further analyze 
 
 51. United States v. Juan, 704 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Under the attorney-client privilege, communications between an at-
torney and a client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are confidential. 
Confidential Informant 59-05071 v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 121, 129 (Fed. 
Cl. 2012) (noting that the privilege includes attorney's “thought processes and 
legal recommendations” (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 
F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).  
 54. United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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and refine the Juan rule’s prohibition on substantial govern-
mental interference with prosecution witnesses. 
 
